From Reformation to Reformation

According to diverse Considerations and the variety of Effects and Objects, the Names of this divine Goodness also vary. Unto this, says our AUTHOR, Love, considered as an act flowing from Goodness, or as an Affection to be referred to Goodness, has regard. And which we here understand not a Natural Love, which is terminated on the Divine Persons themselves, etc. To this the saying of AUGUSTINE has regard, tractate CX on John, chapter VI, opera, tome 3, part 2, column 567, “G

But rather here by the Goodness of God we understand His Benignity, by which He offers Himself as Loveable/Desirable to various Creatures in various modes and degrees, since He desires and does good, to all Creatures generally, and to Men specifically, and to the Elect most especially. From this His abundance and ὑπεροχῇ/pre-eminence of Goodness, God is called יְהוָ֥ה הַטּ֖וֹב, the good Lord, κατ᾽ ἐξοχὴν, par excellence, 2 Chronicles 30:18; indeed, the only Good, Matthew 19:1

The Goodness of God follows; here it is not to be understood of His intrinsic Perfection. That is, as each and every thing, as far as it has Being, also has Metaphysical Truth and Goodness, by which is understood the Conformity of its Being with the approval of the divine Will: so in this sense Goodness must have its place most perfectly in the Most Perfect Being, so that whatever of reality is necessarily contained in the Most Perfect Being, is most perfectly conformed to th

Artist's Depiction of Augustine God’s Knowledge is not properly the Cause of Things, but rather God’s Will; even if His Knowledge also precedes a thing, and is not able to fail; so that God does not receive knowledge from things posited outside of Himself, knowing all things Of Himself, and the effect also follows infallibly upon the Foreknowledge of God: which certain Scholastics appear to have maintained, who out of Augustine affirm that things are, because God knows them:

Arguments from Reason They Object, 2. Arguments; α. From the Knowledge of God extended to All Things; and so also to all Contradictories, of which one is always determinately True, the other false. But, since a matter of this sort, Future or Non-future, does not pertain to the class of Possible Things, to which the Knowledge of Simple Intelligence has regard; neither before the Decree was it able to be evident to God through the Knowledge of Vision: almost nothing else appear

They Object, 1. that there are a Great Many Passages, in which are predicted Effects, not as Possible, but as Future under Condition, yet not decreed, since they did not happen; for example, 1 Samuel 23:11, 12; Matthew 11:21; etc.: see BUDDEUS on the passages cited in his Institutionibus Theologiæ dogmaticæ, tome I, book II, chapter I, § 22, pages 297-299. I Respond: As far as Passages of this sort are concerned, to which appeal is made by our Adversaries; the text in 1 Samue

In a few words our AUTHOR comprehends many things, whereby he energetically refutes this error. 1. By this, says he in his Medulla Theologiæ, the Creature is made independent in its action, and God dependent in His Knowledge. A cause, created of itself, shall determine itself by some prerogative of its own: but the Creator shall follow that predefinition of the creature both with respect to His Knowledge, and with respect to His Will. Which things are plainly absurd and contr

Moving beyond words to the substance of the Doctrine, it is a Knowledge that is called Middle or Conditioned, whereby God knows Free and Contingent Future Things under Condition prior to the Decree. It is called Middle, because it as Middle comes between the Knowledge of Simple Intelligence and Free Knowledge, and it is, as it were, of a mixed condition. It agrees with Natural Knowledge in this, that it precedes the determination of the divine Will decreeing concerning this m

Franciscus Gomarus Antonius Walaeus Indeed, some of Our Own to some extent imprudently consent in thesis, but not in hypothesis, says our AUTHOR. Whether GOMARUS, in his Disputationum Theologicarum X, § 30, 31, and WALÆUS in his Locis Communibus, discoursing concerning God’s Knowledge and God’s Actual Providence, may rightly be said to be patrons of Middle Knowledge, is inquired into in the treatise called Examen van het Ontwerp van Tolerantie etc., part 4, pages 328-333. Tha

Luis de Molina That, in addition, some of God’s Knowledge is Middle or Conditioned, the Jesuits contrive, but quarreling among themselves over the glory of this invention, while they claim it sometimes for Fonseca,[1] sometimes for Lessius,[2] sometimes for Molina:[3] see VOETIUS’ Disputationum theologicarum, part I, pages 254-256, 264, 265; BUDDEUS’ Institutiones Theologiæ dogmaticæ, tome I, book II, chapter I, § 22, pages 295, 296. Resting upon this principle, Molina publis

Frans Burman Which last thing some wrongly deny, BURMAN, for example, whom see in his Synopsi Theologiæ, book I, chapter XXI, § 20, tome I, page 118, and likewise in book I, chapter XXV, § 9, tome I, page 145, under the pretext that All Goodness and Truth flow from the Divine Will; on account of the negated distinction between Power and Will in the divine Essence, on the hypothesis of Spirit being mere Cogitation, and hence only operating by Intellect and Will. This opinion o

The Knowledge of God is either of Vision, or of Simple Intelligence. In this manner the Knowledge of God, perfectly Simple in itself, is distinguished, 1. With respect to its Objects; while the Knowledge of Vision is concerned with things Future or non-future: the Knowledge of Simple Intelligence is concerned with God Himself and those things that flow from the divine Sufficiency immediately of themselves, mere Possibilities. 2. With respect to its Foundations: For, God is co

Foreordination, not Fatalism They Object, 3. that from this follows an Absolute Necessity in things and in God Himself: see what things HOORNBEECK cites out of Crellius, Socinianismo confutato, tome I, book II, chapter III, section III, page 351. But our Author Responds well to this Objection also, that it is a Necessity of Consequence with respect to the First Cause, but not of Coaction, nor Intrinsic in the matters. And in this manner is sufficiently preserved, α. the Conti

In What Sense is the Future Undetermined? Johann a Marck They Object, 2. that the Truth of Contingent and Free Future Things are not determined before the Event. But our AUTHOR rightly Responds, that this is able to be conceded only with respect to, α. the Matters themselves, and, β. their secondary Causes, and, γ. Men; but in no way with respect to God and His Decree: and, with this distinction rightly observed, all that the Socinians advance with such great noise concerning

"To the Word, and to the testimony..." They Object, 1. passages of Scripture, in which Expectation, Repentance, or Acquisition of Knowledge, are attributed to God, Isaiah 5:4; Genesis 6:6, 7; 22:12; etc.: see HOORNBEECK, Socinianismo confutato, tome I, book II, chapter III, section III, pages 358-360. Response: α. That all human Affections are to be removed from God, as inconsistent with the manifold Perfections of God, we have given proof in § 26. Thus in particular, with th

Simon Episcopius And also certain Remonstrants hesitatingly, adds our AUTHOR. For example, from the citation of HOORNBEECK, Socinianismo confutato, tome I, book II, chapter III, section I, page 329, Episcopius acknowledges that this opinion concerning the Knowledge of Future Contingencies being truly competent to God is beset by so many and so great difficulties that it would require a thirteenth labor of Hercules to unravel them; and if the sole authority of the divine predi

Socinian Family Tree The Socinians are opposed, who deny divine Foreknowledge of Free and Contingent Future Things, either entirely with Socinus and Smalcius,[1] or as determinate and infallible, which Crellius appears to maintain, libro de Deo ejusque Attributis, chapter XXIV, opera, tome 4, pages 67-72; see HOORNBEECK’S Socinianismum confutatum, tome I,book II, chapter III, section I, page 336. It is the πρῶτον ψεῦδος, fundamental error, that knowledge of this sort in God i

7. That God knows Free and Contingent Future Things is proven, α. From the passages and reasons whereby it was proven above that God knows All Things, from which general rule these things are in no wise excepted. β. Not only are these things not excepted, but the Knowledge of the same is expressly claimed for God in Psalm 139:2-4. Nothing is Freer and more Contingent than the actions of men, their words and thoughts; but God knows all things things beforehand from afar off, b

6. The hidden Thoughts of the Heart, 1 Kings 8:39; Acts 1:24; John 2:25; Revelation 2:23, in which passages Universal Knowledge, Certain and Immediate, of the Hidden Things of the Heart with sufficient clarity is also claimed for God, and God alone. To whom the same is not able to be denied, unless His Knowledge is thought to be altogether imperfect, and is deprived of an eminent part, not unworthy of Him. God is not able to be ignorant of things that, having been foreseen wi

4. Equally the Greatest things, Psalm 147:4, and the Least things, Matthew 10:29, 30 (which words were omitted by the carelessness of the typesetters in the edition of the Compendii published at Amsterdam, 1727). God numbereth the stars, those vast bodies; He numbereth at the same time the hairs of the head, that is, He knows these things as distinctly as we know those things that we are able to enumerate. For, as all things, the Least as well as the Greatest, most absolutely