De Moor IV:36: Answering Objections to God's Knowledge of Free and Contingent Futures, Part 2
They Object, 2. that the Truth of Contingent and Free Future Things are not determined before the Event. But our AUTHOR rightly Responds, that this is able to be conceded only with respect to, α. the Matters themselved, and, β. their secondary Causes, and, γ. Men; but in no way with respect to God and His Decree: and, with this distinction rightly observed, all that the Socinians advance with such great noise concerning Contingency, not knowable because its truth of it has not been determined, falls. For, the situation is far otherwise with respect to God and with respect to the Matter or Us. What happens contingently with respect to Us, is totally outside of us, and beyond our power; but it is not beyond God’s care, providence, and counsel, neither is it independent of His Decree and Providence. Peter will become a Learned Man, and Peter will not become a Learned man; they are propositions, of which one is true, the other false, the Event confirming: but it is not permitted to us to determine infallibly the Truth of either a priori, since they deal with Contingent matters, undetermined in their second Causes: at the same time, the Truth of both has been determined by the Decree of God, and hence is known infallibly by Him: compare HOORNBEECK, Socinianismo confutato, tome I, book II, chapter III, section I, pages 321-325, section III, pages 364, 365.