De Moor IV:36: Remonstrant Hesitation concerning God's Knowledge of Free and Contingent Futures
And also certain Remonstrants hesitatingly, adds our AUTHOR. For example, from the citation of HOORNBEECK, Socinianismo confutato, tome I, book II, chapter III, section I, page 329, Episcopius acknowledges that this opinion concerning the Knowledge of Future Contingencies being truly competent to God is beset by so many and so great difficulties that it would require a thirteenth labor of Hercules to unravel them; and if the sole authority of the divine predictions was not opposing all reasons, the negative position would appear almost to outweigh the positive: in which manner also the many and great difficulties surrounding the providence of God could more easily be met. At the same time, he believes that it is safest to admit this Foreknowledge; but he permits it to be considered whether it is necessary to know that knowledge of this sort is competent to God, to the end that God might be worshipped. Which things are defended in the Apologia Remonstrantium, chapter II, page 44a. Compare what things are found in Examen van ’t Ontwerp van Tolerantie etc., part 6, pages 154-157.
[Following rather things pleasing to certain Gentiles, than the Word of God.] Compare LEYDEKKER’S historico-theological Dissertation IV, after tome 2 Historiæ Ecclesiæ Africanæ, Section II, which is concerning the introduction of the Epicurean Fortune into Christianity through those that deny Foreknowledge in God of Future Contingencies, pages 667-691: and what things AUGUSTINE relates out of Cicero and disputes against him, City of God, book V, chapter IX, opera, tome 7, columns 94-97, and portion of which HOORNBEECK also mentions, Socinianismo confutato, tome I, book II, chapter III, section I, page 328, in which place you may see that Cicero denies to God all Prescience of Future Things, because he believes that, with this admitted, it is to be acknowledged that all things come about by Fate.