From Reformation to Reformation

Franciscus Gomarus Antonius Walaeus Indeed, some of Our Own to some extent imprudently consent in thesis, but not in hypothesis, says our AUTHOR. Whether GOMARUS, in his Disputationum Theologicarum X, § 30, 31, and WALÆUS in his Locis Communibus, discoursing concerning God’s Knowledge and God’s Actual Providence, may rightly be said to be patrons of Middle Knowledge, is inquired into in the treatise called Examen van het Ontwerp van Tolerantie etc., part 4, pages 328-333. Tha

Luis de Molina That, in addition, some of God’s Knowledge is Middle or Conditioned, the Jesuits contrive, but quarreling among themselves over the glory of this invention, while they claim it sometimes for Fonseca,[1] sometimes for Lessius,[2] sometimes for Molina:[3] see VOETIUS’ Disputationum theologicarum, part I, pages 254-256, 264, 265; BUDDEUS’ Institutiones Theologiæ dogmaticæ, tome I, book II, chapter I, § 22, pages 295, 296. Resting upon this principle, Molina publis

Frans Burman Which last thing some wrongly deny, BURMAN, for example, whom see in his Synopsi Theologiæ, book I, chapter XXI, § 20, tome I, page 118, and likewise in book I, chapter XXV, § 9, tome I, page 145, under the pretext that All Goodness and Truth flow from the Divine Will; on account of the negated distinction between Power and Will in the divine Essence, on the hypothesis of Spirit being mere Cogitation, and hence only operating by Intellect and Will. This opinion o

The Knowledge of God is either of Vision, or of Simple Intelligence. In this manner the Knowledge of God, perfectly Simple in itself, is distinguished, 1. With respect to its Objects; while the Knowledge of Vision is concerned with things Future or non-future: the Knowledge of Simple Intelligence is concerned with God Himself and those things that flow from the divine Sufficiency immediately of themselves, mere Possibilities. 2. With respect to its Foundations: For, God is co

Foreordination, not Fatalism They Object, 3. that from this follows an Absolute Necessity in things and in God Himself: see what things HOORNBEECK cites out of Crellius, Socinianismo confutato, tome I, book II, chapter III, section III, page 351. But our Author Responds well to this Objection also, that it is a Necessity of Consequence with respect to the First Cause, but not of Coaction, nor Intrinsic in the matters. And in this manner is sufficiently preserved, α. the Conti

In What Sense is the Future Undetermined? Johann a Marck They Object, 2. that the Truth of Contingent and Free Future Things are not determined before the Event. But our AUTHOR rightly Responds, that this is able to be conceded only with respect to, α. the Matters themselves, and, β. their secondary Causes, and, γ. Men; but in no way with respect to God and His Decree: and, with this distinction rightly observed, all that the Socinians advance with such great noise concerning

"To the Word, and to the testimony..." They Object, 1. passages of Scripture, in which Expectation, Repentance, or Acquisition of Knowledge, are attributed to God, Isaiah 5:4; Genesis 6:6, 7; 22:12; etc.: see HOORNBEECK, Socinianismo confutato, tome I, book II, chapter III, section III, pages 358-360. Response: α. That all human Affections are to be removed from God, as inconsistent with the manifold Perfections of God, we have given proof in § 26. Thus in particular, with th

Simon Episcopius And also certain Remonstrants hesitatingly, adds our AUTHOR. For example, from the citation of HOORNBEECK, Socinianismo confutato, tome I, book II, chapter III, section I, page 329, Episcopius acknowledges that this opinion concerning the Knowledge of Future Contingencies being truly competent to God is beset by so many and so great difficulties that it would require a thirteenth labor of Hercules to unravel them; and if the sole authority of the divine predi

Socinian Family Tree The Socinians are opposed, who deny divine Foreknowledge of Free and Contingent Future Things, either entirely with Socinus and Smalcius,[1] or as determinate and infallible, which Crellius appears to maintain, libro de Deo ejusque Attributis, chapter XXIV, opera, tome 4, pages 67-72; see HOORNBEECK’S Socinianismum confutatum, tome I,book II, chapter III, section I, page 336. It is the πρῶτον ψεῦδος, fundamental error, that knowledge of this sort in God i

7. That God knows Free and Contingent Future Things is proven, α. From the passages and reasons whereby it was proven above that God knows All Things, from which general rule these things are in no wise excepted. β. Not only are these things not excepted, but the Knowledge of the same is expressly claimed for God in Psalm 139:2-4. Nothing is Freer and more Contingent than the actions of men, their words and thoughts; but God knows all things things beforehand from afar off, b

6. The hidden Thoughts of the Heart, 1 Kings 8:39; Acts 1:24; John 2:25; Revelation 2:23, in which passages Universal Knowledge, Certain and Immediate, of the Hidden Things of the Heart with sufficient clarity is also claimed for God, and God alone. To whom the same is not able to be denied, unless His Knowledge is thought to be altogether imperfect, and is deprived of an eminent part, not unworthy of Him. God is not able to be ignorant of things that, having been foreseen wi

4. Equally the Greatest things, Psalm 147:4, and the Least things, Matthew 10:29, 30 (which words were omitted by the carelessness of the typesetters in the edition of the Compendii published at Amsterdam, 1727). God numbereth the stars, those vast bodies; He numbereth at the same time the hairs of the head, that is, He knows these things as distinctly as we know those things that we are able to enumerate. For, as all things, the Least as well as the Greatest, most absolutely

2. In addition to Himself, God knows things merely and simply Possible through His Omnisufficiency, which things, nevertheless, He does not will to do. This necessarily flows from Self-Knowledge in God. For, if He knows Himself, He knows His Omnisufficiency: if He knows His Omnisufficiency, He knows all Possible things, as it is evident from those things that we set forth concerning the Root of Possibility in § 21. For, since all things depend upon God, nothing is able to be

If we descend to enumerate the specific Objects of divine Cognition and Knowledge, 1. Without any doubt, God knows Himself, Matthew 11:27; John 10:15, in which the knowledge of the Son is attributed to the Father, and the knowledge of the Father to the Son, not exclusively of the other Person, as if He were ignorant of His own Person; nor exclusively of the Holy Spirit, in comparison with 1 Corinthians 2:10, 11: but mutual Knowledge of ἀλλήλων, one another, is attributed to t

Socinus Moreover, God’s Knowledge extends to All Things, according to Hebrews 4:13, which passage we have just now treated. In John 21:17, when there is a question concerning Peter’s love of the Lord, which is an internal affection of the heart; but Peter means for the knowledge of things of this sort to be comprehended under all the things known by the Lord: and this confession of Peter is approved by the Lord, who acquiesces in it. 1 John 3:20: according to this text we are

Voetius VOETIUS, in his Disputationum Theologicarum, part III, page 691, out of Pererius[1] and Lapide,[2] in Commenting on Romans 11, observes that eleven modes and relations are given whereby the Knowledge of God far excels all created knowledge: “First, with respect to its object: For God by His own knowledge is acquainted with all things past, present, and future, all possibilities, and Himself, the deep of all things, as it were. Second, with respect to the mode and perf

In Hebrews 4:13, the Perfection of divine Cognition is asserted, 1. Negatively, οὐκ ἔστι κτίσις ἀφανὴς ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ, there is not any creature that is not manifest in His sight. 2. Positively, in a twofold expression; for πάντα, all things, are said, a. Γυμνὰ…τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς αὐτοῦ, naked…to His eyes. Indeed, many vices, even the most filthy, are covered by garments; but they do not impede the Knowledge of God, that it might be less penetrating. And so this Metaphor is taken f

Hence, 4. our Author most aptly asserts that God knows Most Perfectly, that is, α. Intimately, by penetrating to the Essence of all things, and by completely exhausting all Attributes of the same. β. Infallibly, because, of course, God knows all things through Himself and His own Essence, neither does divine Cognition depend upon things themselves uncertain, nor is it able to be confirmed by any new light of more certain means; hence there is no doubt in it, nor is fear of th

Johannes a Marck 2. From this the Eternity of His Cognition flows, asserted in Acts 15:18, where αἰὼν,[1] because it is used of God and His Essential Perfection, is believed rightly to denote the most absolute Eternity; see our AUTHOR’S Exercitationes Textuales XLIII, Part IV, § 4. Certainly the Knowledge of a Being Eternal, altogether Simple, and always Infinitely Perfect, ought also to be Eternal. And God is not able to know by a Most Simple Act, so as to prevent Him from k

Johannes a Marck Our AUTHOR expounds the Mode of the Divine Knowledge, § 35, and its Object, § 36. God knows: 1. By a Most Simple Act, such that there is here no place for Habit as distinct from Act, with the Habit now resting, now passing again into act. α. Indeed, the Knowledge of an altogether perfect Being also ought to be altogether perfect, such that His consummate Perfection always ought to be present. β. By a transition from Habit to Act Immutability would also fall,