From Reformation to Reformation

THESIS XXVII: Hitherto the commanding principium: the executing principium follows, which is the power of God, whereby God is able to...

THESIS XIX: In the Scripture there are various names for the divine will, which nevertheless indicate concepts, diverse to us, of...

THESIS XVIII: The principium commanding action is the will, whereby God wills Himself of Himself, and beyond Himself all things because...

THESIS XIV: Hitherto the divine properties of the first class: Of the second class are those that are applicable to God in such a way...

THESIS XI: Immutability is a property of God, which excludes from God all possibility of mutation: 1. with respect to existence; 2. ...

THESIS VI: The Properties of the divine nature, or essence, are GOD’S essential attributes, whereby the truth and majesty of the divine...

THESIS I: Hitherto the προλεγόμενα/Prolegomena of Christian Theology: now follows the explication of the body of Theology itself by...

Thesis I: The knowledge of God is defined. Thesis II: God is described. Explanation: 1. The description of God is confirmed. 2. The...

The Goodness of God follows; here it is not to be understood of His intrinsic Perfection. That is, as each and every thing, as far as it has Being, also has Metaphysical Truth and Goodness, by which is understood the Conformity of its Being with the approval of the divine Will: so in this sense Goodness must have its place most perfectly in the Most Perfect Being, so that whatever of reality is necessarily contained in the Most Perfect Being, is most perfectly conformed to th

Artist's Depiction of Augustine God’s Knowledge is not properly the Cause of Things, but rather God’s Will; even if His Knowledge also precedes a thing, and is not able to fail; so that God does not receive knowledge from things posited outside of Himself, knowing all things Of Himself, and the effect also follows infallibly upon the Foreknowledge of God: which certain Scholastics appear to have maintained, who out of Augustine affirm that things are, because God knows them:

Arguments from Reason They Object, 2. Arguments; α. From the Knowledge of God extended to All Things; and so also to all Contradictories, of which one is always determinately True, the other false. But, since a matter of this sort, Future or Non-future, does not pertain to the class of Possible Things, to which the Knowledge of Simple Intelligence has regard; neither before the Decree was it able to be evident to God through the Knowledge of Vision: almost nothing else appear

They Object, 1. that there are a Great Many Passages, in which are predicted Effects, not as Possible, but as Future under Condition, yet not decreed, since they did not happen; for example, 1 Samuel 23:11, 12; Matthew 11:21; etc.: see BUDDEUS on the passages cited in his Institutionibus Theologiæ dogmaticæ, tome I, book II, chapter I, § 22, pages 297-299. I Respond: As far as Passages of this sort are concerned, to which appeal is made by our Adversaries; the text in 1 Samue

In a few words our AUTHOR comprehends many things, whereby he energetically refutes this error. 1. By this, says he in his Medulla Theologiæ, the Creature is made independent in its action, and God dependent in His Knowledge. A cause, created of itself, shall determine itself by some prerogative of its own: but the Creator shall follow that predefinition of the creature both with respect to His Knowledge, and with respect to His Will. Which things are plainly absurd and contr

Moving beyond words to the substance of the Doctrine, it is a Knowledge that is called Middle or Conditioned, whereby God knows Free and Contingent Future Things under Condition prior to the Decree. It is called Middle, because it as Middle comes between the Knowledge of Simple Intelligence and Free Knowledge, and it is, as it were, of a mixed condition. It agrees with Natural Knowledge in this, that it precedes the determination of the divine Will decreeing concerning this m

Franciscus Gomarus Antonius Walaeus Indeed, some of Our Own to some extent imprudently consent in thesis, but not in hypothesis, says our AUTHOR. Whether GOMARUS, in his Disputationum Theologicarum X, § 30, 31, and WALÆUS in his Locis Communibus, discoursing concerning God’s Knowledge and God’s Actual Providence, may rightly be said to be patrons of Middle Knowledge, is inquired into in the treatise called Examen van het Ontwerp van Tolerantie etc., part 4, pages 328-333. Tha

Luis de Molina That, in addition, some of God’s Knowledge is Middle or Conditioned, the Jesuits contrive, but quarreling among themselves over the glory of this invention, while they claim it sometimes for Fonseca,[1] sometimes for Lessius,[2] sometimes for Molina:[3] see VOETIUS’ Disputationum theologicarum, part I, pages 254-256, 264, 265; BUDDEUS’ Institutiones Theologiæ dogmaticæ, tome I, book II, chapter I, § 22, pages 295, 296. Resting upon this principle, Molina publis

Frans Burman Which last thing some wrongly deny, BURMAN, for example, whom see in his Synopsi Theologiæ, book I, chapter XXI, § 20, tome I, page 118, and likewise in book I, chapter XXV, § 9, tome I, page 145, under the pretext that All Goodness and Truth flow from the Divine Will; on account of the negated distinction between Power and Will in the divine Essence, on the hypothesis of Spirit being mere Cogitation, and hence only operating by Intellect and Will. This opinion o

The Knowledge of God is either of Vision, or of Simple Intelligence. In this manner the Knowledge of God, perfectly Simple in itself, is distinguished, 1. With respect to its Objects; while the Knowledge of Vision is concerned with things Future or non-future: the Knowledge of Simple Intelligence is concerned with God Himself and those things that flow from the divine Sufficiency immediately of themselves, mere Possibilities. 2. With respect to its Foundations: For, God is co

Foreordination, not Fatalism They Object, 3. that from this follows an Absolute Necessity in things and in God Himself: see what things HOORNBEECK cites out of Crellius, Socinianismo confutato, tome I, book II, chapter III, section III, page 351. But our Author Responds well to this Objection also, that it is a Necessity of Consequence with respect to the First Cause, but not of Coaction, nor Intrinsic in the matters. And in this manner is sufficiently preserved, α. the Conti

In What Sense is the Future Undetermined? Johann a Marck They Object, 2. that the Truth of Contingent and Free Future Things are not determined before the Event. But our AUTHOR rightly Responds, that this is able to be conceded only with respect to, α. the Matters themselves, and, β. their secondary Causes, and, γ. Men; but in no way with respect to God and His Decree: and, with this distinction rightly observed, all that the Socinians advance with such great noise concerning