J.H. Heidegger's Corpus of Christian Theology: Theology in General: Reason and Revelation, Part 4

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40.  That pertains to the discretive use of reason, whereby from those expressed by consequence is inferred, what is contained virtually in the things expressed.

To the διακριτικὸν/discriminative use of Reason especially pertain that, whereby from the express words of revelation right reason infers, discerns, and adjudicates what is contained in the virtue and power of the express words, and so is consequent upon the same.  For they are of two sorts, which Revelation relates, namely, מְלִיצָה, speech clear, explained,[1] or ἑρμηνεία/explanation; and חִידָה/enigma, or speech clipped, obscure, which requires a sharp mind and exercised senses for its understanding, and so is intelligible to the wise, and is suited to the thing to be signified.  Thus Solomon writes, to understand a proverb, ‎וּמְלִיצָה, and speech explained, the words of the wise, ‎וְחִידֹתָם, and their enigmas, Proverbs 1:6.  The former had an immediately accessible, straightforward meaning (even if to the negligent, the unbelieving, or the one setting his own reasons in opposition, it is able to appear as an enigma, Habakkuk 2:6[2]); that latter is intelligible not to just anyone, not to the rude, the ignorant, the young, the lazy, but to adults, the wise, those attending without murmuring to revelation and to ratiocination, and studying it; finally, to those νουνεχῶς/ thoughtfully eliciting from the express letter that which is contained in the power and value of it, which they are wont to call the consequence, or the thing implicit in the explicit.

41.  That consequences of this sort are able to be deduced, only fanatics deny.

That consequences of this sort are rightly deduced from manifest and literal revelation, no one today is so insane, so rigid, if you exclude some fanatics, admitting only τὸ ῥητὸν, the letter, that they would deny it.  For undoubtedly it belongs to the wise man to understand and to deduce the things that follow from the things posited and manifestly written:  but it belongs to the foolish, the lazy, the young to be ignorant of them.  Moreover, all argumentation is the drawing of consequences from antecedents through good and necessary consequence.  Now, it is well-known that Theology is not only Noëtic, consisting in the understanding of terms, simple and complex:  but also Dianoëtic, or argumentative, in such a way that the Theologian presents argumentation, that is, he explains and demonstrates a thing less obvious from a thing more well-known and manifestly posited, and a thing implicit and hidden in things openly posited.  For, that all the sacred writers, and so God Himself, who inspired them, and Christ, the Son of God, deduced one thing from another, is clearer than the noonday sun.  Nor from elsewhere is more acquaintance with Divine things and Heavenly Wisdom to be obtained.  And all application of revelation to its proper uses, even indeed to man’s awareness of its promises and threats, depends upon argumentation, deduction, and so upon consequence.

[1] לִיץ, in the Hiphil, signifies to deride, or to interpret.  מְלִיצָה signifies a taunting proverb (Habakkuk 2:6), or an interpretation (from what requires an interpretation) 

[2] Habakkuk 2:6:  “Shall not all these take up a parable (‎מָשָׁל) against him, and a taunting proverb (‎וּמְלִיצָ֖ה חִיד֣וֹת) against him, and say, Woe to him that increaseth that which is not his! how long? and to him that ladeth himself with thick clay!”