De Moor II:40: The Supreme Judge: Neither Enthusiastic Experience, nor Reason

[If you are being blessed by the translation work, please consider supporting the work and speeding it on its way.  Click here to watch a brief video on the project.]

Negatively, א.  an Enthusiastical Spirit ought not here to be set up as the Supreme and Infallible Judge, for the same reasons that were given above, § 30, 31, against this as a Principium of Faith.

Nevertheless, with this Enthusiastical Spirit our AUTHOR does not wish to be compared Zwingli’s nocturnal counselor.  This has regard to the narration of Zwingli in Coronide de Eucharistia, opera, part II, folio 249, where he narrates that, while he was working in Zurich to the end that the Mass might be altogether abolished, it was objected against him by a certain Scribe, that all the examples that he had previously set forth to prove that this is[1] is to be taken as this signifies, were parabolic; but that not one was adduced, in which was only a simple trope, which sort he imagined in the words of the Lord’s Supper:  that he responded, as indeed was the case, that in the explication of the parable, when Christ said, the seed is the Word of God,[2] there is a simple trope, in which it is manifestly ought to be taken as it signifies; and that all acquiesced to this response, so that the decree concerning the abolition of the Mass followed.  Nevertheless, while they continued to insist that examples be produced that were not conjoined with any parable, and time was running on, and he was still not able to recollect a clear passage of this sort; it happened that at night in a dream he was very distress in soul over this matter:  but behold, “ἀπὸ  μηχανῆς, by some contrivance,” says he, “a counselor appeared to be present (whether he was black or white I remember nothing, for I recount a dream), who said, O sluggard, you shall certainly respond to him with what it written in Exodus 12, for it is the Passover, this is the passing over of the Lord:”  consult ECKHARDUS’ Fasciculum Controversiarum cum Calvino, chapter I, question VI, pages 26, 27.  But observe, this particular Spirit does not occur as the authority ending the controversy that was agitated concerning the Lord’s Supper and the true interpretation of the sacramental words; but Zwingli, who had already long since obtained a true understanding of this controversy from the Scripture itself, as the normative Judge and best Interpreter of itself, is only further confirmed in this his opinion, not by the authority of an Enthusiastical Spirit outside of Scripture, but from Scripture itself, which remained to him the Norm and supreme Judge in deciding the Question:  consult RIVET’S Exercitationem CXXIV in Genesin, opera, tome I, pages 478, 479; GERDES’ Introductionem in Historiam Reformationis, tome I, § 127, 128, pages 321-325; WITSIUS’ Miscellaneorum sacrorum, tome I, book I, chapter XXIV, § 27, pages 380, 381.  The Zwinglian interpretation of the words of Exodus 12:11 is defended against the Lutherans by WENDELIN[3] in his Exercitationibus theologicis LXXXVII, pages 1331-1333.

ב.  Neither is human Reason or any Philosophy to be held as such a Supreme and Infallible Judge.  Which our AUTHOR wishes to be observed against the Socinians and many Philosophers, who show that they thus think, either in their practice, in denial of the mysteries of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Satisfaction, and other things that Scripture plainly relates; or who sometimes confess this even in words.  HOORNBEECK, Socinianismo confutato, tome I, book I, chapter VI, pages 89-94, most clearly proves both concerning the Socinians.  In that place, that I might relate only one or the other example out of Ostorodus’ Institutionibus, you may see Chapter IV, page 30, cited, in which he, disputing against the Trinity, says:  “But if anyone should say that this our reason does not prevail, since in Sacred Scripture such things are written concerning Christ as the Son of God and the Holy Spirit, etc., to this we respond that it is indeed greatly to be deplored, that men stick in such deep darkness, since it is impossible for the same matter to be at the same time both false and true.  Therefore, if Reason, that is, the mind, or the intellect plainly shows that the Trinity of persons in God is false, how would it ever come into the mind of man endowed with understanding that it is nevertheless able to be true and able to be proven by the Word of God?”  Ostorodus in chapter VI, where he disputes against the divine nature of Christ, page 43, says:  “But we say, what Reason attests to us, and that as evidently and clearly as the Sun shining at noon, that it is impossible, and therefore false, that two natures are found in Christ.”  Although elsewhere the Socinians contradict themselves and speak as if they agree completely with us:  see HOORNBEECK’S Socinianismum confutatum, tome I, book I, chapter VI, pages 111, 112.  To the Philosophers that our AUTHOR mentions are to be added especially Spinoza, see SPANHEIM’S Elenchum Controversiarum, opera, tome 3, columns 1002, 1003; LEYDEKKER’S Dissertationem contra Bekkerum, section XXIV, § 34, pages 445-450, 453, who[4] nevertheless also speaks chastely enough in appearance elsewhere, see LEYDEKKER’S Dissertationem contra Bekkerum, section XXIV, § 34, pages 454-456:  and the Author of the treatise entitled, Philosophiæ Sacræ Scripturæ Interpretis; which thesis, that Philosophy is the Interpreter of Sacred Scripture, the Curators prohibited to be taught or defended at the Academy of Leiden; as the Most Illustrious HEIDANUS and COCCEIUS against the book just now mentioned also communicated their opinion in writing to the Nobles of Holland;  see HEIDANUS’ Consideratien, etc., pages 138, 139; SPANHEIM’S Epistolam de novissimis in Belgio dissidiis, pages 67-69, who against the Dissertation concerning Philosophy as the Interpreter of Sacred Scripture sets forth twelve arguments in his Elencho Controversiarum, opera, tome 3, columns 999-1001, which are altogether worthy to be diligently weighed:  consult VAN MASTRICHT’S Gangrænam Novitatum Cartesianarum, prior Section, chapter X, § 1-18, pages 105-125; WEISMANN’S Historiam Ecclesiasticam, Part II, Century XVII, § 29, page 726, in which you may see that Lodewijk Meyer, a Physician of Amsterdam, and publisher of Posthumorum Spinosæ, is held as the author of the Exercitation of that Paradox concerning Philosophy as the Interpreter of Scripture;[5] and WALCH’S Miscellanea Sacra, book I, Exercitation VI, § 3, 7, pages 146, 151, § 13-24, pages 159, 172, in which he specifically expostulates against Johann Lorenz Schmidt’s new Germanic Version of the Pentateuch.[6]  Let me not now mention the Remonstrants, those defenders of the Socinians, in HOORNBEECK’S Socinianismum confutatum, tome I, book I, chapter VI, pages 94 and following; nor repeat those things just now observed in Chapter I, § 32.  Compare the theses committed to the press by a student of the Most Illustrious RÖELLIUS for a public defense, and which Röellius himself applauded with a Poem subjoined, although the airing of those theses was hindered, in Judicio Ecclesiastico laudato, chapter II, § 5, page 36.  Add VRIESIUS’ Exercitationem de Officio Philosophi circa Revelata.  The Theses concerning holding Reason as the highest Interpreter of the Scriptures, and not acknowledging the Scripture, or God speaking in the Scripture, as the Interpreter of itself/Himself, being equivalent to the doctrine of the Socinians, from the writings of those that confess themselves to be committed to Reformed Rites, are set forth and refuted with gravity by WITSIUS, Twist des Heeren met zynen Wyngaard, chapter XXI, pages 281-290.  The inane thesis of BRAUN[7] concerning this matter, out of his Disputatione IV, § 8, our AUTHOR also sets forth, Narratione Apologetica contra Braunium, § XL, pages 38, 39; and that these he calls to a more accurate examination in an Appendice Narrationis Apologeticæ, § LXXVI, pages 170 and following, in which at the same time he nevertheless shows just how much in this matter Braun contradicts himself and speaks ἀσύστατα, things incoherent.

The πρῶτα ψεύδη, fundamental errors, of the Socinians and Pseudo-philosophers are:  the Confusion of Reason and Revelation; the hypothesis concerning the ambiguity of accommodating Scripture to Reason; that the principia of Philosophy are certain, and hence what Philosophy does not perceive is false.

Their Scope/Goal:  to defend their Errors, which are contrary to Scripture.

We urge against them:  α.  What Reason is nowhere extant as sound and infallible in the concrete, that is not able to arrogate to itself certain and infallible Judgment concerning divine matters of certain truth:  but, that sound and infallible Reason in the concrete is today sought in vain, shall be abundantly proven from those things that are to be said in Chapter XV concerning the universal Corruption of fall man, especially in § 27-29.  The Fallibility of Reason in each one of us is sufficiently gathered from the variety of judgments in all those things that depend upon the dictate of Reason.  Indeed, common Notions, indited in the mind by God, survive; but even those in this destitute state of man are much obscured and corrupted in many things and diminished in all things, and hence are to be emended and completed by Revelation.  The power of reasoning, perceiving, judging, extrapolating, survives in man, but has been greatly injured and hence is to be restored by the internal grace of the Spirit, correcting and corroborating, especially in the business of saving Religion; in this way to a certain extent vision, hearing, speech, motion, and not rarely intellect, judgment, memory, even in decrepit old men often are not altogether lacking, but are not at all able to furnish the same thing as in young or vigorous men.  And, although we do learn many truths through this power of Reasoning properly applied, even in the business of Religion; yet that use of Reason is not always proper in all, or even in any, men, so that many truths of reason everywhere might not remain hidden to reason, and also the most filthy errors might be mixed by reason with revealed truths:  which is the learned and pious observation of the Theologians of Leiden in Judicio Ecclesiastico laudato, chapter II, § 9, page 46, deservedly withdrawing from Reason the Supreme and Infallible Judgment in matters of faith and interpretation of the Scriptures.  β.  Sacred Scripture confirms this our opinion, when Reason in Spiritual things, exceeding its capacity, Scripture plainly pronounces to be blind, with this blindness not even completely removed in the regenerate.  But to that which, 1.  in Sacred Things is blind, Judgment, much less Supreme and Infallible Judgment, is not to be committed concerning Sacred Things:  for if the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch, Matthew 15:14.  But according to 1 Corinthians 2:14, ψυχικὸς—ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται τὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ Θεοῦ, the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, and, when he undertakes to judge concerning them, they are foolishness to him:  neither is it strange that he cannot know them, for they are to be discerned spiritually:  see STEPHEN DE BRAIS’ Lecturas theologicas de Auxiliis, after Analysin Epistolæ ad Romanos, pages 444-505:  add 2 Corinthians 3:5.  2.  What is above Reason, that is not to be judged by Reason:  but Scripture teaches us, and faith embraces, truths that are placed above the orbit and sphere of Reason.  Therefore.  For, as the Senses do not assume to themselves Judgment in those things that are above Sense, and belong to Reason:  so neither is Judgment competent to Reason concerning those things that are supernatural and are above Reason:  but see 1 Corinthians 2:7; Matthew 13:11.  The Imperfection of the Degree of Illumination in believers, conjoined with the sublimity of these Mysteries, drives even the regenerate to their prayers, Open thou mine eyes, etc., Psalm 119:18, and presses from them humble confessions, I am brutish, etc., Proverbs 30:2-4.  γ.  Not only is Reason blind in spiritual matters, but it is also averse to divine truth, and adverse to it, Romans 8:7.  But to that which is wont to make opposition to divine truth, which is for us the sole norm of faith and life; to that, I say, Judgment concerning the truth of faith and the sense of divine revelation is not at all safely committed.  On the other hand, from of old Philosophers were called the Patriarchs of Heretics, as it is in TERTULLIAN’S contra Hermogenem, chapter VIII, opera, pages 236, the truth of which saying experience also confirms.  δ.  Therefore, the method of Scripture is completely contrary, which commands to take the mind captive and to submit to the Word of God, 2 Corinthians 10:4, 5.  Now, what ought to submit to Scripture and to be judged by Scripture, to that supreme Judgment concerning the Scripture and its argument is not able to be committed.  For thus the matter stands, both here with respect to Reason, and with respect to the Church in the controversy with the Papists.  Indeed, ε.  if Reason be here the Supreme and Infallible Judge, Scripture and its Interpretation would be subject to Reason and human judgment:  but one would for good reason dread to arrogate such a thing to himself concerning the divine Word, which is so prejudicial to its dignity.  According to 1 John 5:9, the divine witness is greater than human witness.  And rightly, ϛ.  does our AUTHOR observe that this Judgment of which we treat is not transferred to Reason or Philosophy, even in the very smallest matter delivered by the Holy Spirit in the Sacred Books, since by that very thing that substance of divine Faith, ultimately resting upon the Word of God, would be taken away as such.  But this would be absurd:  since the formal reason of Faith, why I believe this, is the Word of God and its infallible truth, 1 Thessalonians 2:13.  But, if to Reason we commit the Supreme Judgment in matters of faith, the final analysis of Faith shall be in us; and the supreme reason why we thus believe shall be this, that so it appears to us:  consult VAN MASTRICHT’S Gangrænam Novitatum Cartesianarum, prior Section, chapter X, pages 105-148; LEYDEKKER’S Facem Veritatis, locus II, controversies II, III, pages 29-40; STAPFER’S Theologicæ polemicæ, tome I, chapter III, section XIX, § 1355-1359.  MILL, in his Oratione de Fatis Theologiæ exegeticæ, in Miscellaneis Sacris, page XXI, from a Manuscript ofאשרי תמימי דרך, Blessed Are the Undefiled in the Way, relates this method, which the Karaites, to be commended above the Rabbis in exegetical method, maintain is to be used in the explication of Sacred Scripture:  “They teach that use is to be made of Reason and the Judgment of Intellect that attends to the words and connection of the text, and also legitimately deduces by consequence other truths from the things said; but that also the light of Scripture ought to be added, and hence they are wont elegantly to call Reason and Scripture שתי הנרות בשתי ידינו, the two lights in both our hands.  But, where a more profound and abstruse Sense of Scripture occurs, that it is not to be too thoroughly searched out, nor is it therefore to be rejected, because we are not able to grasp it:  for, for that reason it is called הנבואה/prophecy, as inspired by God,[8] and what is more sublime than all reason, which is to be brought into subjection to Scripture; as what has God as author, and is confirmed by so many miracles that there is sufficient certainty concerning the Word of God, and so we are able to believe, although we do not everywhere understand it.”

The Objections, briefly and vigorously resolved by our AUTHOR, do not much delay us; for example,

α.  With the help of Reason we elicit the true Sense.  Response:  We acknowledge this, and taught the manifold Use of Reason in Theology, Chapter I, § 32.  But already at that time we observed at the same time that Reason is here, not the principal, but the minister:  whence with no greater right of Reason would you conclude it to be the Supreme and Infallible Judge in matters of Faith, than you might assign the same to the Senses of sight and hearing; since they also intervene in learning and grasping the true Sense of Sacred Scripture.

β.  The Judgment of Discretion is competent to human Reason.  Response:  The Judgment of Discretion, 1.  differs much from the Supreme and Infallible Judge, which we yield to no man.  2.  The Judgment of Discretion is more private, proper to individual believers, and does not serve the universal Church as a norm.  3.  We do not attribute the Judgment of Discretion absolutely to human Reason or individual men:  while we do assert that that Judgment is competent to believers, we believe that it is able to be exercised rightly only with the illumination of the Holy Spirit.

γ.  In matters known Naturally also, we certainly admit the Judgment of Reason also.  Responses:  1.  Matters known Naturally are thereupon considered as such, in which, even as such, the foundation of the truth is not our Concept, Idea, or Judgment; but the matter itself, and the conformity of our Concept with it.  2.  But to what extent the same matters are also revealed in Scripture and are the object of faith, the divine Word as such founds our faith, and compels us unto assent:  and to this revealed Word the Judgment of Reason is to be subjected, even in matters known by nature.  Thoroughly compare WITSIUS’ Exercitation XVII, tome 2, Miscellaneorum sacrorum, which is concerning the Use and Abuse of Reason concerning the Mysteries of Faith; SALDENUS’ Otia Theologica, book IV, Exercitation VII, which is concerning the Operations of human Reason and of the Holy Spirit in Spiritual matters, pages 718-733, in which against the Author of Exercitationis de Philosophia Sacræ Scripturæ Interprete he admirably explains what then is the Operation of the Holy Spirit upon the hearts of believers concerning revealed Truths, so that they might be savingly known and evaluated, and then turned into practice, which without Him Reason is not capable of furnishing; and for the denial of which hyperphysical operation the ignorance of that Exercitator is not at all sufficient.  Byvoegsel tot het Formulier van Ondertekeninge gestalt by de Classis van Walcheren anno 1693, article I.  CAMPEGIUS VITRINGA in his Oratione de Synodis, pages 95-98:  “The Doctrine of Religion would be obscure to no one:  all would readily consent to the judgments, even as spiritual men discern spiritual things.[9]  But pride works, and also the corruption of intellect, so that all do not obtain it of themselves.  They stumble over certain Dogmas in the Doctrine of Christ and the Apostles, which according to their capacity they do not perfectly understand, or with difficulty they harmonize with certain of their own prejudiced notions, which they most falsely call right Reason.  These idols of their minds they worship, venerate, adore:  with these they draw near to consult the mouth of the Lord (Ezekiel 14:3, etc.); holding it as certain and established among them to believe nothing that sounds different, although most clearly revealed.  And so they seek this counsel out of audacity, to the end that they, abusing their genius and erudition, might bend the sense of the Divine Oracles and accommodate it to their hypotheses, which they imprudently and arrogantly contrive for themselves without the Word of God, and make in such a way that the Spirit says and teaches nothing other than what was to be said and taught according their own opinion and sense of judgment; even if to someone, holding and treating the Word of God with greater reverence and modesty, it may prove manifest that the interpretations that they set forth are not elicited from the Scriptures, but are intruded upon them violently and insolently, as if it were proposed, not to seek the Doctrine of Faith from the Scripture, but to emend what they find in them.  But, if the dogmas of Scripture be inconsistent with Reason, you say, O good people! what Reason are you speaking of, right and sound, or false and adulterous, a mockery of your thoughts?  Reason indeed, rightly so called, is a splendid thing, a Divine gift, common to all, which few use, most abuse, being mad with reason itself.  This no one, skilled in the interpretation of the Divine Word, or in declaring the mysteries of Faith, thinks is to be neglected:  but modest men thus suppose that in the most excellent nature of God, and in His counsels and words, and in their connection and end, there are a great many things that not only do we not know, but the capacity of our mind does not reach; whether because it did not seem good to God to reveal to us in this world all their extent and rationale (for He only revealed things necessary to know for instilling faith and supporting hope), or because the nature of our mind cannot contain an understanding of Him:  here they halt; they assent to things clearly revealed; they bridle excessive curiosity and command their minds to be silent, and forbid it impudently to intrude upon and dispute what it hath not seen (Colossians 2:18).  Indeed, they recognize that the harmonious and rational consent of all parts of revelation concerning the way of salvation is so beautiful that they illuminate, not destroy nor subvert, each other mutually, and Reason itself also:  but that contrary to those things those especially err in accommodating the system of Christian Theology to reason, even those that insolently boast of it; of which sort are those that make the Savior not God, and yet teach that He is to be worshipped and adored as God.  I have adduced these things so that it might be revealed that the fault is not in the Canon of judgments concerning Faith, if one should apply it circumspectly to resolve questions concerning Religion.”  Moreover, consider STAPFER, Theologicæ polemicæ, tome 2, chapter x, § 219-232, pages 1024-1034, in which he responds to the Objection of the Anti-scripturists taken from passages that are said to furnish for us ideas little worthy of God, unless help be afforded to them by a suitable interpretation sought from the principles of Reason:  and also BUDDEUS, Isagoge ad Theologiam universam, book II, chapter VIII, § 12, tome 2, pages 1757b-1758, in which against Richard Simon he teaches that Protestants and Socinians do not have the same Principium of Religion and of interpreting Sacred Scripture; neither do those that do not make with the Socinians in this part therefore regard it as necessary to pass over unto the camp of the Papists:  add § 13, tome 2, pages 1794b-1796.

[1] Matthew 26:26; Mark 14:22; Luke 22:19; 1 Corinthians 11:24.

[2] Luke 8:11.

[3] Marcus Friedrich Wendelin (1584-1652) was a Reformed Theologian and educator.  He served as Rector at Zerbst from 1610 to 1652.

[4] That is, Spinoza.

[5] Philosophia Sacræ Scripturæ Interpres was published anonymously, and was initially thought to be the work of Spinoza.  It was actually penned by Lodewijk Meyer (1629-1681), a Dutch Enlightenment scholar and Rationalist philosopher.

[6] Johann Lorenz Schmidt (1702-1749), a radical Wolffian, began a translation of the Bible (Wertheim Bible) in keeping with the rationalistic spirit of the age.  For example, he refused to use the New Testament in the interpretation and translation of the Old, denied the Christological bearing of Old Testament passages, and removed much traditional religious language.  Schmidt’s Pentateuch ignited public controversy, and so his translation was never finished.

[7] Johannes Braun (1628-1708) was a Reformed theologian.  He served as Professor of Theology at Groningen (1680-1708).

[8] The verbal root, נבא, signifies to announce.

[9] See 1 Corinthians 2:13, 14.