De Moor II:26: The Perspicuity of Scripture, Part 3

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Following the ancient Gnostics; see IRENÆUS’ book II Contra Hæreses, chapters XXVI, XXVII, pages 154, 155, together with MASSUET’S Dissertatione prævia III in Irenæum, article 2, pages CXI, CXII; our AUTHOR’S Orationem II after Exercitationes Miscellaneas, page 425, 426; and the ἀλληγορομανοῦντας/allegorizing Origenists; see DANÆUS’ ad Augustinum de Hæresibus, chapter XLIII, number 8, page 964b:  today there are both the Enthusiasts, see below § 30, 32, and especially the Papists, who claim that it is to be acknowledged necessarily that the Scriptures are most obscure, both with respect to Substance and with respect to the manner of delivery; since they relate the highest mysteries, etc., prophecies concerning future things, etc.; and if you consider the manner of speaking, innumerable reasons for difficulty are found, etc., whence it happens that even Scripture itself presents testimony concerning its difficulty and obscurity; as it is in Bellarmine’s book III de Verbo Dei, chapter I, column 159, 162.

Our AUTHOR most satisfactorily uncovers the Scope/Goal of the Papists; that is, of course, that they might turn the common people from Reading, assert the necessity of Traditions, and subject all to the interpretation of the Church.

Bellarmine

Now, Bellarmine argues against us in this way:

1.  Concerning the difficulty and obscurity of whatever the Scripture presents testimony, that is difficult and obscure.  But the Scripture presents testimony concerning its own difficulty and obscurity.  Therefore.  But let us see what proofs of the Minor he adduces.

              α.  He says in columns 159, 160, David asks that his eyes be uncovered, Psalm 119:18; but David was so great a Prophet:  therefore, with what a night of ignorance are others beset?

Response:  This is ignoratio elenchi.[1]  We do not ask concerning the blindness of the man that reads Scripture, but of the Perspicuity or obscurity of the Scripture read.  The ignorance and slowness of man in understanding the Scriptures no more removes their Perspicuity, than does the blindness of man the light of the sun; the sun is not to be said to be obscure because the blind man does not see.  And so the Subjective Perspicuity of Scripture is easily able to consist with the necessary, internal Illumination of man, that the Scripture might also be made objectively perspicuous to him.

              β.  Bellarmine in column 160 took another proof from 2 Peter 3:16, in which Peter testifies concerning the Epistles of Paul that in them are certain things difficult to understand, which the unstable and unlearned pervert.

Response:  In this way nothing is proven against us:  for, 1.  Peter speaks concerning matters delivered in Scripture, not concerning the manner of delivery, which we especially intend when we call the Scripture Perspicuous.  Now, Peter says, ἐν οἷς, in which, which is not able to be referred to the preceding ἐπιστολαῖς/Epistles, but ought to be referred to the immediately preceding περὶ τούτων, of these things, and has regard to the matters contained in Paul’s Epistles.[2]  2.  If mention now be made of the Epistles themselves and the manner of delivery, it would be only a particular proof, from which the obscurity of the whole Scripture could not at all be concluded.  For far more Biblical Books are given than the Epistles of Paul and Peter.  Neither are those Epistles said to be obscure in their entirety, but only certain things in them, τινα.  Now, it is sufficient for us, if the matters necessary for salvation be perspicuously related in Scripture:  neither does it hinder that in some places they are set forth more obscurely, if only elsewhere they be found more clearly expressed.  3.  And the Apostle does not say that all, even the faithful and illuminated, pervert these τινα because of their obscurity:  but ἃ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ ἀστήρικτοι στρεβλοῦσιν, these things the unlearned and unstable wrest.  Now, they are ἀμαθεῖς, not simply unlearned, those that have not yet learned; but also unteachable, those that are neither willing nor able to learn and be educated, unto which signification Henricus Stephanus cites a passage out of PLATO’S de Legibus, book III:  now, they are ἀστήρικτοι that are turned about with every wind of doctrine.[3]  It is not strange that men of this sort wrest the Scriptures, although plain and perspicuous.  These are said στρεβλοῦν, to wrest, not only those things difficult to understand, but these things ὡς καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς γραφάς, as also the other scriptures, so that the fault is to be attributed, not to the Scriptures, but to these men.  Finally, 4.  Some things are δυσνόητα, hard to grasp, yet the sense of which one may search out with the application of effort; other things are ἀνόητα, beyond understanding, in which the obscurity is completely invincible.

2.  Then Bellarmine, book III de Verbo Dei, chapter I, columns 162, 163, sets forth examples of many Passages, in which there is the greatest difficulty, generally arguing in this way:  What both in substance and in manner of expression is obscure and difficult, that is such in itself.  The Sacred Scripture both in substance and in manner of expression is obscure and difficult.  Therefore.  He proves the Minor; concerning substance, by the example of sublime mysteries, or of prophecies concerning events which were going to happen only long afterwards.  With respect to the manner of expression, he appeals to Passages in which he wishes to be observed either the ambiguity of the words, for example, in John 8:25, when Jesus says, τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅ, τι καὶ λαλῶ ὑμῖν, which the Vulgate renders, The Beginning, who also speak to you:  or the imperfection of the speech, for example, in Romans 5:12 and following, where he notes that in the entire sentence there in not a main verb:  or conflict, of which sort of passages there are many, which at first glance appear contrary, for example, Exodus 20:5 and Ezekiel 18:20:  or impropriety, in which tropes, allegories, hyperbata,[4] ironies, figures of this sort without number:  or changed order, as when you compare Genesis 10:31 with Genesis 11:1.

But I respond that in this argumentation the fallacy a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter[5] is admitted.  What is everywhere and in all cases difficult and obscure, that is simply such:  but what is only in some places and in certain cases difficult and obscure, that is deservedly judged difficult and obscure in accordance with those.  In the former sense, the Minor with respect to Scripture is false.  By the latter nothing is concluded against us, who, 1.  acknowledge obscurity in matters of substance, and indeed in some matters more than others; but at the same time we assert Perspicuity in the manner of setting those same matters forth:  2.  we admit that the degree of Perspicuity is not everywhere the same, but we assert that the more obscure things are made known in other, more perspicacious Passages.

And so the Proofs of the Minor are also faulty in both members, as they proceed from pure particulars.

Some mysteries and prophecies are obscure:  Therefore, all things in Scripture are obscure.

Some forms of speech in Scripture are obscure:  Therefore, all expression in Scripture is obscure.

But our AUTHOR rightly observes, the Perspicuity of Scripture notwithstanding, “God with good reason willed that there be certain examples of Obscurity in the Scripture, for the manifestation of His own wisdom, the distinction of gifts, esteem for the word, the ruin of unbelievers, our humiliation, the exercise of faith, and diligence in reading and prayer.”

3.  To the Objection sought from various Reasons, our AUTHOR Responds with sufficient clarity.  With respect to Reason δ, sought from the Necessity of Exposition, which Bellarmine here and there urges in the chapters cited, we observe that the Interpretation of Scripture is done, not only because of the obscurity of Scripture in some things, but also, even more so, because of the blindness and slowness of the human intellect, and the ready aversion of the human will to good.

STAPFER defends the Sufficient Perspicuity of Sacred Scripture also against the Naturalists, Theologicæ polemicæ, tome 2, chapter X, § 136, 140-152, pages 976-980, 982-987.

[1] Ignoratio elenchi, sometimes called the fallacy of the irrelevant conclusion or thesis, is the presentation of an argument that does not address the question at hand.

[2] 2 Peter 3:16:  “As also in all his epistles, speaking in them of these things; in which are some things hard to be understood (ὡς καὶ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς [feminine], λαλῶν ἐν αὐταῖς περὶ τούτων [neuter]· ἐν οἷς [neuter] ἔστι δυσνόητά τινα), which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other scriptures, unto their own destruction.”

[3] See Ephesians 4:14.

[4] That is, inversions of normal word order.

[5] A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simplicter is the fallacy of arguing from a qualified statement to an unqualified one, from a particular to a general.